After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with firm heterogeneity. Within this framework we show that non-separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous firm heterogeneity cause the market equilibrium to err in many ways, concerning the number of products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we also show that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of firm heterogeneity. In particular, the inefficiency of the market equilibrium seems to be largest when selection among heterogeneous firms is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many firms with low productivity and relatively few firms with high productivity.
Introduction
Do monopolistically competitive industries yield an optimal level of product diversity? As discussed by Neary (2004) , this 'classic issue' in industrial organization motivated the canonical formalization of the Chamberlinian model (Chamberlin, 1933) as put forth by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . These propose 'reduced form'models that "regard aggregate demands as if they result from the maximisation of a utility function de…ned directly over the quantities of goods, and the form of the utility function is intended to capture the desire for variety" (Dixit, 2004, p.125) . 1 The classic issue can be itself split into four questions concerning the optimality of the market outcome (Stiglitz, 1975) : Are there too few or too many products? Are the quantities of the products too small or too large? Are the products supplied by the right set of …rms, or are there 'errors'in the choice of technique? Are monopolistically competitive industries too large or too small with respect to the rest of the economy?
The Chamberlinian model makes four basic assumptions (Bishop, 1967; Brakman and Heijdra, 2004) : the number of sellers in a group of …rms is suf…ciently large so that each …rm takes the behavior of other …rms in the group as given; the group is well de…ned and small relative to the economy; products are physically similar but economically di¤erentiated so that buyers have preferences for all types of products ('love for variety'); there is free entry. In this setup, optimality rests on how the market mechanism deals with the crucial tradeo¤ of 'e¢ ciency versus diversity' (Kaldor, 1934) .
As forcefully highlighted by Dixit and Stiglitz (1975) , there are good reasons to doubt that the market will generally strike the right balance due to the public nature of diversity in the reduced form approach. As in these models the range of products enters utility as a direct argument in addition to the quantities consumed, the range itself becomes a public good whose social bene…t is not fully re ‡ected in private incentives. In the words of Spence (1976, pp. 230-231):
" [T] here are con ‡icting forces at work with respect to the number or variety of products. Because of setup costs, revenues may fail to cover the costs of a socially desirable product. As a result, some products may be produced at a loss at an optimum. This is a force tending towards too few products. On the other hand, there are forces tending towards too many products. First, because …rms hold back output and keep price above marginal cost, they leave more room for entry than would marginal cost pricing. Second, when a …rms enter with a new product, it adds its own consumer and producer surplus to the total surplus, but it also cuts into the pro…ts of the existing …rms. If the cross elasticities of demand are high, the dominant e¤ect may be the second one. In this case entry does not increase the size of the pie much; it just divides it into more pieces. Thus, in the presence of high cross elasticities of demand, there is a tendency toward too many products".
As the issue of optimal product diversity does not admit a general settlement, explicit models with a detailed formulation of demand are used to isolate and analyze the four questions described above. The canonical choice is to model an economy consisting of two sectors. The …rst sector is monopolistically competitive and is the focus of the analysis. The second sector is perfectly competitive and represents the rest of the economy. Its purpose is to hold factor prices in check and to create the slack needed to answer the question whether the monopolistically competitive sector is too small or too big. This way the market is allowed to eventually misallocate resources not only within the monopolistically competitive sector but also between this sector and the rest of the economy.
The best known insights of the canonical model concern the special case in which the 'group utility'de…ned over di¤erentiated products is separable across them, the demand of each product is CES and …rms are homogeneous. In this case, the model shows that the …rst-best ('unconstrained') optimum calls for larger …rms and more product variety than the market provides. From a normative perspective, however, this result is traditionally regarded of little practical relevance for policy intervention because implementing the unconstrained optimum requires the use of lump-sum instruments that are hardly available in reality. These are needed to subsidize the entry of …rms that otherwise would not cover their setup ('entry') costs due to marginal cost pricing at the optimum. A lot of attention has, therefore, been devoted to the 'constrained'optimum in which the monopolistically competitive sector is …nancially self-su¢ cient. Under this constraint, the market is shown to provide the optimal number of products, the optimal size …rms and hence the optimal size of the sector.
The robustness of these results has been investigated along several dimensions, with particular attention devoted to the impact of variable demand elasticity and …rm heterogeneity. These extensions are already discussed by Stiglitz (1975) , Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , who show that, when the elasticity of demand is allowed to vary, the market equilibrium ceases to be constrained optimal. In particular, products are too many (too few) and are supplied in too small (too large) quantities when the elasticity of 'product utility' is increasing (decreasing) in the quantity consumed. As for …rm heterogeneity, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consider a variant of their model in which there are two groups of di¤erentiated products that are perfect substitutes for each other with each group having CES sub-utility. Both …xed and marginal costs are allowed to di¤er between the two groups but not within them. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) use this variant to show that the determination of the set of products to be supplied depends on a richer list of factors: …xed and marginal costs, the elasticity of the demand schedule, the level of the demand schedule and the cross-elasticities of demand. As a result, constrained optimality eventually applies only to a zeromeasure set of parametrizations. A more exhaustive treatment of this issue can be found in Spence (1976) while Stiglitz (1975) reaches similar conclusions in a model of the capital market in which …rms with heterogeneous costs issue securities whose returns are imperfectly correlated with each other.
After some decades of relative oblivion, interest in the optimality properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the 'heterogeneous …rms revolution'in international trade theory (Melitz and Redding, 2012) . This has been initiated by Melitz (2003) , who shows that a Dixit-Stiglitz model with CES demand, endogenous …rm heterogeneity and …xed export costs (but without the homogeneous good sector) predicts 'new' gains from trade liberalization through the selection of the most e¢ cient …rms. Subsequent papers show that a similar result holds when demand exhibits variable elasticity, though …xed export costs are not necessarily needed for the result to materialize in this case (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Behrens and Murata, 2012 ). 2 The validity of these (among other) insights on international trade issues when alternative speci…cations of demands are allowed for is discussed by Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012) . Using a framework with variable elasticity of substitution (VES), they show that CES is just a knife-edge case. While this …nding is reminiscent of the conclusions by Stiglitz (1975) , Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012) do not discuss its implications for optimum product variety as those early contributors do. This is done, instead, by Dhingra and Morrow (2012) who fully characterize the optimality properties of a general demand system derived from separable 'group utility'. Their normative analysis thus complements the positive analysis of Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012) , showing that, in the absence of the homogeneous sector, the market outcome achieves the (unconstrained) optimum under CES but not under VES. When a homogeneous sector is instead introduced, Melitz and Redding (2012) show that CES leads to constrained rather than unconstrained optimality due to the misallocation of resources between sectors. In other words, with CES …rm heterogeneity does not change the welfare insights of the original Dixit-Stiglitz framework while things change in the case of VES.
The present paper goes back to the full set of classic questions laid down at the beginning of this introduction, with renewed emphasis on the question whether in the market equilibrium the products are supplied by the right set of …rms. It does so in a Melitzian framework of endogenous …rm heterogeneity with variable demand elasticity. Its aim is twofold. It shows that, with variable demand elasticity and endogenous …rm heterogeneity, the market outcome errs with respect to the number of products, the size and the choice of producers, and the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, it also shows that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of …rm heterogeneity.
None of the papers previously cited simultaneously addresses the four classic questions on the optimality of monopolistic competition in a framework with variable demand elasticity and endogenous …rm heterogeneity. Moreover, none of them provides a systematic quantitative analysis of the impact of di¤erent degrees of …rm heterogeneity on the extent of market ine¢ ciencies. The discussion in Spence (1976) is systematic but qualitative, while Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) con…ne themselves to the special scenario discussed above. Dhingra and Morrow (2012) are closer to what the present paper tries to achieve but the focus of their comparative statics is on the parametrization of demand rather than on the parametrization of …rm heterogeneity. In addition, not having the homogeneous good sector prevents them from discussing between-sector misallocation. Di¤erently, Stiglitz (1975) presents comparative statics results on the heterogeneity parameters but his heterogeneity is not endogenous and his approach, based on a utility de…ned over alternative portfolios of assets, is quite distinct from the canonical model of monopolistic competition.
Clearly, as pointed out by Stiglitz (1975) and others, without some appropriate parametrization of the problem, it would be hard to cut any new ground on the issues of interest. We rely on the speci…c parametrization of linear demand introduced by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) as applied to endogenous …rm heterogeneity by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . This parametrization is less general than the VES systems studied by Dhingra and Morrow (2012) and Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and J. F. Thisse (2012) in terms of product utility but allows for cross-product e¤ects that are absent in the former paper and only touched upon in the latter. For ease of exposition, in the main text we also focus on a speci…c but commonly used Pareto parametrization of …rm heterogeneity, relegating the discussion of the validity of some key results in the case of a generic continuous parametrization to the appendix. There we also present the welfare analysis of the degenerate case in which …rms are homogeneous as discussed by Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) for the same demand system.
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 brie ‡y presents the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . Sections 3 and 4 respectively derive and compare the market equilibrium and the (unconstrained) optimum. Section 5 investigates the impact of …rm heterogeneity on the gap between the equilibrium and optimum outcomes. Section 6 discusses the constrained optimum. Section 7 concludes.
The model
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , consider an economy populated by L consumers, each endowed with one unit of labor. Preferences are de…ned over a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties indexed i 2 , and a homogeneous good indexed 0. All consumers own the same initial endowment q 0 of this good and share the same utility function given by
with positive demand parameters , and , the latter measuring the 'love for variety'and the others measuring the preference for the di¤erentiated varieties with respect to the homogeneous good. The initial endowment q 0 of the homogeneous good is assumed to be large enough for its consumption to be strictly positive at the market equilibrium and optimal solutions. Labor is the only factor of production. It can be employed for the production of the homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale with unit labor requirement equal to one. It can also be employed for the production of the di¤erentiated varieties under monopolistic competition. The technology requires a preliminary R&D e¤ort of f > 0 units of labor to design a new variety and its production process, which is also characterized by constant returns to scale. The R&D e¤ort leads to the design of a new variety with certainty whereas the unit labor requirement c of the corresponding production process is uncertain, being randomly drawn from a continuous distribution with cumulative density
This corresponds to the empirically relevant case in which marginal productivity 1=c is Pareto distributed with shape parameter k 1 over the support [1=c M ; 1). Hence, as k rises, density is skewed towards the upper bound of the support of G(c). 3 The R&D e¤ort cannot be recovered and this gives rise to a sunk setup ('entry') cost.
3 Equilibrium and optimum
The market outcome
In the decentralized equilibrium consumers maximize utility under their budget constraints, …rms maximize pro…ts given their technological constraints, and markets clear. It is assumed that the labor market as well as the market of the homogeneous good are perfectly competitive. This good is chosen as numeraire, which then implies that the wage equals one. The market of di¤erentiated varieties is, instead, monopolistically competitive with a one-to-one relation between …rms and varieties.
The …rst order conditions for utility maximization give individual inverse demand for variety i as
whenever q
Demand for consumed varieties can be derived from (3) as
where the set is the largest subset of such that demand is positive, N is the measure ('number') of varieties in and p = (1=N ) R i2 p i di is their average price. Variety i belongs to this set when
where p max represents the price at which demand for a variety is driven to zero. 4 When a variety is produced by a …rm with unit labor requirement c, the corresponding …rst order conditions for pro…t maximization are satis…ed by an output level equal to
where 'm' labels equilibrium variables and
is the total supply of di¤erentiated varieties. Expression (6) de…nes a cuto¤ rule for survival: 3 While the analysis in the main text rests on the Pareto distribution, several results have more general validity as discussed in Appendix A. 4 Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that rewriting the indirect utility function in terms of average price and price variance reveals that it decreases with average prices p, but rises with the variance of prices 2 p (holding p constant), as consumers then re-optimize their purchases by shifting expenditures towards lower priced varieties as well as the numeraire good. Note also that the demand system exhibits 'love of variety': holding the distribution of prices constant (namely holding the mean p and variance 2 p of prices constant), utility rises with product variety N . 
Due to free entry and exit, in equilibrium expected pro…t is exactly o¤set by the sunk entry cost
Given (2) and (7), this 'free entry condition'can be rewritten as
where, due to the law of large numbers,
k is the ex ante probability that an entrant will produce as well as the ex post share of entrants that eventually produce while
] is the ex ante expected pro…t conditional on producing as well as the ex post average pro…t of producers. Condition (8) can be solved for the unique equilibrium cuto¤ marginal cost
Finally, the number of producers can be determined as a function of c m by observing that marginal …rms with unit labor requirement c = c m make zero pro…t, i.e. p(c m ) = c m = p max . Recalling (5) , that implies the following 'zero cuto¤ pro…t condition'
where, again due to the law of large numbers, p m is the ex ante expected price conditional on producing as well as the ex post average price of producers:
The 'zero cuto¤ pro…t condition' can then be solved to obtain the equilibrium number of producers (and varieties) as a function of the equilibrium cuto¤ as
with the corresponding equilibrium number of entrants given by
The optimal outcome
As the quasi-linearity of (1) implies transferable utility, social welfare may be expressed as the sum of all consumers'utilities. This implies that the …rst best ('unconstrained') planner chooses the number of varieties and their output levels so as to maximize the social welfare function given by individual utility (1) times the number of consumers L, subject to the resource constraint, the varieties'production functions and the stochastic 'innovation production function' (i.e. the mechanism that determines each variety's unit labor requirement as a random draw from G(c) after f units of labor have been allocated to R&D). Speci…cally, given (1), the planner chooses the number N E of R&D projects and the output levels of associated varieties so as to maximize social welfare
with respect to q c 0 , q c (c) and N E subject to the aggregate resource constraint
stating that the supply of the homogeneous good (q After substituting (13) into (12), the planner's problem can be rewritten as the maximization of
with respect to q(c) and N E . The corresponding …rst order conditions are then:
Rearranging (15) shows that optimal output q o (c) has to satisfy
where 'o' labels …rst best optimum variables and
is the optimum total supply of di¤erentiated varieties. Result (17) reveals that, just like the market, also the planner follows a cuto¤ rule allowing only for the production of varieties whose unit labor requirements are low enough: q o (c) 0 only for c c o . We can thus de…ne the conditional distribution of unit input requirements for varieties that the planner actually produces as (17) and (3) can be used to show that the …rst best output levels would clear the market in the decentralized scenario only if each producer priced at its own marginal cost. To see this, note that (3) implies q(c) = 
where (17) and solving for N o gives a planner's cuto¤ condition analogous to the market 'zero cuto¤ pro…t condition'(10)
In order to …nd a second condition analogous to the market 'free entry condition' (8), we can substitute the optimal quantities from (17) as well as the optimal number of varieties (18) in the second condition in (16) 
so that the …rst best cuto¤ marginal cost evaluates to
This then determines the …rst best number of varieties through (18) . To sum up, (20) and (18) are the …rst best planner's analogues of expressions (9) and (11) derived for the market equilibrium.
Equilibrium vs. optimum
There are two dimensions along which the e¢ ciency of the market outcome can be evaluated: the number of varieties actually produced N m and the (conditional) cost distribution of the …rms producing them as dictated by the cuto¤ c m . In turn, the cost distribution determines the e¢ ciency of the corresponding distributions of …rm sizes and prices. 5 The tradeo¤s the …rst best planner faces when …rms are heterogeneous can be highlighted by rewriting the …rst best objective (12) in terms of means and variances of the distribution G(c) as follows
are the unconditional mean 5 Dhingra and Morrow (2012) provide a detailed discussion of these issues that emphasizes the role of alternative parametrizations of demand when utility is separable. The bias in market allocations by demand characteristics is summarized in their Table 2 . If we also assumed separability (by imposing = 0), our demand system would be compatible with the parametrizations classi…ed in the upper right hand corner of that table.
and variance of quantities, and b cq = R c M 0 cq(c)dG(c) b cb q is the convariance between quantities and unit input requirements. 6 The …rst bracketed term on the right hand side of (21) corresponds to the planner's objective when marginal costs are homogeneous. Here the tradeo¤s are in terms of: (a) average quantity vs. average marginal cost; (b) number of varieties vs. …xed costs. The second bracketed term has to be considered when unit labor requirements are heterogeneous. It shows that, due to love of variety, consumers dislike a consumption bundle in which the quantity consumed varies across varieties. Formally, they dislike a consumption bundle with large deviations from the average (large b q ), the more so the stronger the love of variety (larger ). On the other hand, there is a penalty in o¤ering a basket of varieties with small deviations around the average as higher productivity could be achieved by assigning little production to varieties with high marginal costs (b cq < 0).
Selection
Comparing the equilibrium cuto¤ with the optimal one is straightforward. Specifically, comparing expressions (9) with (20) 
should not be supplied. We thus have:
Proposition 1 (Selection) Firm selection in the market equilibrium is weaker than optimal.
The intuition behind this proposition can be gauged by recalling that, as discussed in Section 3. Corollary 2 (Average productivity) Aggregate productivity in the market equilibrium is lower than optimal.
Firm size
Proposition 1 has also implications in terms of optimality of the …rm size distribution. To see this, one can use (6) and (17) to rewrite output levels as
With homogeneous unit labor requirements we would have b q = b cq = 0 and the planner's objective boils down to the one in Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) . See Appendix B for further details.
Corollary 3 (Within-sector misallocation) The market equilibrium oversupplies high cost varieties and undersupplies low cost ones with respect to the optimum.
In other words, misallocation materializes as a lack of market concentration: in the market equilibrium there are relatively too many small …rms and relatively too few large …rms with respect to the optimum. The intuition behind this corollary can be explained as follows. The markup m (c) = (c m c) =2 is a decreasing function of c. This implies that more productive …rms do not pass on their entire cost advantage to consumers as they absorb part of it in the markup. As a result, the price ratio of less to more productive …rms is smaller than their cost ratio and thus the quantities sold by less productive …rms are too large from an e¢ ciency point of view relative to those sold by more productive …rms.
Turning to average …rm size q, given (2), expressions (6) and (17) together with expressions (9) and (20) imply The intuition behind this corollary follows from the discussion of the previous one: a lower cuto¤ with markup pricing makes …rms on average larger in the optimum than in the market equilibrium.
Finally, given (11), (18) and (22) Corollary 5 (Between-sector misallocation) In the market equilibrium the total supply of di¤ erentiated varieties is smaller than optimal.
Product variety and entry
The equilibrium is suboptimal also when it comes to the number of varieties supplied. However, given (11) and (18) 1
which is the case when as well as L are large and when , f as well as c M are small. Hence, we can state the following result:
Corollary 6 (Product variety) Product variety is richer (poorer) in the market equilibrium than in the optimum when varieties are close (far) substitutes, the sunk entry cost is small (large), market size is large (small) and the di¤ erence between the highest and the lowest possible cost draws is small (large).
This corollary has an interesting implication for the impact of larger market size, driven for example by the integration of previously autarkic national markets. In this scenario, it could well be that each national market on its own is small enough to entail < 1 whereas the internationally integrated market is large enough to entail > 1 . Then, according to the corollary, market integration would cause the transition from a situation in which product variety is ine¢ ciently poor (N m < N o ) to a situation in which it becomes ine¢ ciently rich (N m > N o ). Turning to entry, the equilibrium number of entrants is given by
with j 2 fm; og. Then, together with (11) and (18) as well as (9) and (20) , expression (24) can be used to show that c m = 2
which is the case when as well as L are large and , f as well as c M are small. This leads to:
Corollary 7 (Entry) More (fewer) …rms enter in the market equilibrium than in the optimum if varieties are close (far) substitutes, the sunk entry cost is small (large), market size is large (small) and the di¤ erence between the highest and the lowest possible cost draws is small (large).
As larger market size reduces 2 , it causes the transition from a situation in which the resources devoted to develop new varieties are ine¢ ciently small (N Given that (23) and (25) imply 1 < 2 , corollaries 6 and 7 together imply that the market provides too little entry with too little variety for < 1 and too much entry with too much variety for > 2 . For 1 < < 2 it provides, instead, too much variety and too little entry.
The impact of …rm heterogeneity
We now turn to the relation between the degree of heterogeneity and the extent of the market ine¢ ciency. The key question here is whether or not the ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most, that is, when there are a lot of low productivity …rms and few high productivity ones.
As discussed by Ottaviano (2012) , the scale and shape parameters of the Pareto distribution (2) regulate the 'heterogeneity'of cost draws along two dimensions: 'richness' and 'evenness' (Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani, 2003) . First, the scale parameter c M quanti…es 'richness', de…ned as the measure ('number') of di¤erent unit labor requirements that can be drawn. Larger c M leads to a rise in heterogeneity along the richness dimension, and this is achieved by making it possible to draw also larger unit labor requirements than the original ones. Second, the shape parameter k is an inverse measure of 'evenness', de…ned as the similarity between the probabilities of those di¤erent draws to happen. When k = 1, the unit labor requirement distribution is uniform on [0; c M ] with maximum evenness. As k increases, the unit labor requirement distribution becomes more concentrated at higher unit labor requirements close to c M : evenness falls. As k goes to in…nity, the distribution becomes degenerate at c M : all draws deliver a unit labor requirement c M with probability one. Hence, smaller k leads to a rise in heterogeneity along the evenness dimension, and this is achieved by making low unit labor requirements more likely without changing the unit labor requirements that are possible. Accordingly, more richness (larger c M ) comes with higher average unit labor requirement ('costincreasing richness'), more evenness (smaller k) comes with lower average unit labor requirement ('cost-decreasing evenness').
Given the cuto¤ expressions (9) and (20), more heterogeneity has di¤erent impacts on selection depending on whether it comes through more richness or evenness. To see this, rewrite (9) and (20) as:
k are the shares of viable varieties and the bracketed terms are average …rm pro…t for the market equilibrium and average surplus per variety for the optimum respectively. For any given cuto¤s, more cost-increasing richness (larger c M ) decreases the left hand sides of both expressions through its depressing e¤ect on the share of viable varieties. As the right hand sides are constant, (9) and (20) can keep on holding only if the cuto¤s rise. Di¤erently, for any given cuto¤s (smaller than c M ), more cost-decreasing evenness (smaller k) increases the left hand sides of both expressions through its enhancing e¤ect on both the share of viable varieties and average pro…t or surplus. Again, as the right hand sides are constant, (9) and (20) can keep on holding only if the cuto¤s fall. Hence, while more cost-increasing richness makes selection softer, more cost-decreasing evenness makes it tougher.
When we focus on the percentage deviation of the market equilibrium from the optimum, only the change in evenness matters for several outcomes. Specifically, given c m = 2 1=(k+2) c o , more eveness (smaller k) leads to a larger percentage gap in the cuto¤s between the market equilibrium and the optimum ((c m c o ) =c o rises) whereas more richness is immaterial. Hence, we have:
Proposition 8 (Heterogeneity and selection) More cost-decreasing evenness increases the percentage gap in the cuto¤ s between the market equilibrium and the optimum. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on this gap.
As in the case of Proposition 1, Proposition 8 gives rise to a series of parallel corollaries. First, given o = 2 1=(k+2) m , smaller k increases the percentage aggregate productivity gap between the market equilibrium and the optimum ( o m = o rises). We can therefore state:
Corollary 9 (Heterogeneity and productivity) More cost-decreasing evenness increases the percentage gap in the aggregate productivity between the market equilibrium and the optimum. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on this gap.
Second, recall that, with respect to the optimum, the market equilibrium undersupplies varieties with marginal cost c 2 [0; 2 2 1=(k+2) c o ) and oversupplies varieties with marginal cost c 2 ( 2 2
1=(k+2) c o =c m also falls whereas it does not change when c M changes. This leads to:
Corollary 10 (Heterogeneity and within-sector misallocation) More costdecreasing evenness makes the overprovision of varieties relatively more likely than its underprovision in the market equilibrium. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on this. 
when k is initially small and increases it when k is initially large. We can then write:
Corollary 12 (Heterogeneity and between-sector misallocation) More cost-increasing richness increases the percentage gap in the total output of the di¤ erentiated varieties between the market equilibrium and the optimum. More cost-decreasing evenness increases the percentage gap if evenness is initially low and decreases it if evenness is initially high.
Fifth, given again Proposition 8, expressions (11) and (18) with the associated condition (23) lead to:
Corollary 13 (Heterogeneity and product variety) Less cost-decreasing evenness and more cost-increasing richness makes the underprovision of variety relatively more likely than its overprovision in the market equilibrium.
Analogously, given (24) and the associated condition (25), we can write: Corollary 14 (Heterogeneity and entry) Less cost-decreasing evenness and more cost-increasing richness makes the lack of entry relatively more likely than excess entry in the market equilibrium.
In the limit, when k goes to in…nity, the Pareto distribution convergences to a Dirac distribution with all density concentrated at c M . In this case without heterogeneity, in which the number of entrants and the number of producers coincide, the market always yields too much entry and too much variety with respect to the optimum (Ottaviano and Thisse, 1999). 7 Finally, we can look at the relation between heterogeneity and welfare. The welfare level attained in the market equilibrium can be expressed as a function of a corresponding cuto¤ through the following substitutions in the planner's objective (14) :expression (11) can be used together with N E = N (c M =c m ) k to substitute for N E ; expression (8) can be used to substitute for f ; expression (6) can be used to substitute for q(c). The result is:
Analogously, the welfare level attained in the optimum can be expressed as a function of a corresponding cuto¤ through the following substitutions in the planner's objective (14) : expression (18) can be used together with N E = N (c M =c m ) k to substitute for N E ; expression (19) can be used to substitute for f ; expression (17) can be used to substitute for q(c). This gives:
Given c m = 2 1=(k+2) c o , it is readily veri…ed that we have W m < W o , as to be expected. Comparing (26) and (27) also reveals: 8 Corollary 15 (Heterogeneity and welfare) More cost-decreasing evenness and less cost-increasing richness reduce the percentage gap in welfare between the market equilibrium and the optimum.
In other words, from a welfare point of view, the ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most: a lot of low productivity …rms and few high productivity ones.
Constrained optimum
The unconstrained optimum discussed so far has been traditionally regarded of little practical relevance from a normative point of view. Its implementation requires the use of lump-sum instruments to subsidize the entry of …rms that otherwise would not cover their entry costs due to marginal cost pricing at the unconstrained optimum. As these instruments are considered hardly available in reality, it is interesting to look at the 'constrained' optimum, in which the di¤erentiated sector has to be …nancially self-su¢ cient.
The constrained planner maximizes (14) with respect to N E subject to two constraints: pro…t maximizing output (6) and the 'free entry condition' (8) . These impose the planner the market cuto¤ (9) . Substituting (6) and (8) in (14) allows us to rewrite the constrained problem as the maximization of
with respect to N E . Then, using N E = N (c M =c m ) k to substitute for N E in the …rst order condition of the planner's problem yields
Comparing this expression with (11) reveals that product variety is richer in the constrained optimum than in the market equilibrium. Expression (11) can be used together with N E = N (c M =c m ) k to substitute for N E while (8) can be used to substitute for f in the planner's objective. The result expresses welfare in the constrained optimum as a function of the market cuto¤
This is smaller than W o but larger than W m . In particular, we have
Given (9), less cost-increasing richness (smaller c M ) reduces the percentage gap between the market outcome and the constrained optimum. The same happens in the case of more cost-decreasing evenness (smaller k) when initial evenness is high. Di¤erently, when initial evenness is low, more cost-decreasing evenness raises the gap. 9 As in the case of the unconstrained optimum, the ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most.
Conclusion
After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the 'heterogeneous …rms revolution'in international trade theory initiated by Melitz (2003) . The 9 See Appendix C for a proof.
availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with …rm heterogeneity allows to bring back into the normative debate the full set of questions the canonical formalization of the Chamberlinian model by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) was designed to answer. In particular, it provides a useful analytical tool to address the question whether in the market equilibrium the products are supplied by the right set of …rms, or there are rather 'errors'in the choice of technique.
We have contributed to this debate by showing that in a model with nonseparable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous …rm heterogeneity, the market outcome errs in many ways: with respect to the number of products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we have also shown that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of …rm heterogeneity. In particular, we have found that the ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium seems to be largest when selection is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many …rms with low productivity and relatively few …rms with high productivity. This holds from the viewpoints of both unconstrained and constrained e¢ ciency.
These insights have been obtained for a parametrization of demand that is admittedly speci…c but still non-separable and more ‡exible than the CES. It would be important to understand how general they are by checking their validity under alternative non-separable parametrizations with variable demand elasticity, such as the one proposed by Behrens and Murata (2007) . This is left to future research. 
Appendix A -General distribution
The analysis in the main text is based on the assumption that the distribution G(c) from which entrants draw their unit labor requirements is a Pareto distribution. In this appendix we show that some key results do not depend on such assumption.
Market outcome
Instead of the Pareto distribution, consider a generic
with
. The 'free entry condition'becomes
In turn, the 'zero cuto¤ pro…t condition'becomes 
Unconstrained optimum
The planner maximizes
The two …rst order conditions are
As utility can take only positive values, it must be N o E > 0 at the maximum. Rearranging the former …rst order condition gives
. Equation (34) and the constraint q o (c) 0 imply that the same cuto¤ rule for the planner as in the main text:
Integrating (34) across c to obtain Q o , plugging the result in c o = Q o =L and solving for N o gives the planner's cuto¤ condition analogous to (32)
. Then, substituting (36) and (35) in the second …rst order condition yields
Constrained optimum
When the di¤erentiated sector has to be …nancially self-su¢ cient, the constrained planner cannot a¤ect the pro…t maximizing choices of …rms in terms of quantities and prices but it can a¤ect the number of …rms that operate in the economy. Hence, the planner follows the same free entry condition (31) and thus chooses the same cuto¤ as the market
As to the number of entrants, the planner maximize utility in (33) with respect to N E subject to the market quantities
The …rst order condition of the planner's problem is
Substituting (38) and (39) then gives Turning to the number of varieties supplied at the di¤erent outcomes, the cuto¤ conditions (32) and (40) readily establish that the constrained planner provides richer product variety than the market equilibrium. On the other hand, (32) and (36) are functions of the cuto¤s that di¤er from one another only up to a positive multiplicative constant: N m (x) N and N o (x) = N (x)=2. However, the sign of the derivative N 0 (x) depends on the properties of G(c):
where c(x) = R x 0 cdG(c) =G(x) and c 0 (x) is its derivative. The sign is ambiguous because for a generic distribution function the derivative c 0 (x) of the conditional mean based on right truncation can be larger than 1. Hence, N (x) need not be decreasing everywhere, even if it equals 0 at x = and diverges to +1 when x goes to 0. We can, nonetheless, state a su¢ cient condition for c 0 (x) < 1, and, therefore, for N 0 (x) < 0. The condition is that G(c) is log-concave (see Lemma 1 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). 10 As this is only a su¢ cient condition, there exists a larger family of functions than the log-concave ones that guarantee N 0 (x) < 0. This ensures that, within each outcome (whether market equilibrium or unconstrained optimum), a lower cuto¤ is associated with richer product variety. It does not allow, however, to unambiguously rank the unconstrained planner and the market equilibrium in terms of product variety as in the Pareto case discussed in the main text.
As a …nal comment, it should be noted that no result is, instead, available concerning the implications of di¤erent degrees of …rm heterogeneity for the e¢ ciency gap of the market equilibrium in the case of a generic G(c) as, di¤er-ently from the Pareto case, in the generic case the unconditional distribution generally puts little structure on the conditional (truncated) distribution.
Appendix B -Homogeneous …rms
For parsimony, let us focus on the unconstrained optimum and the market equilibrium. The constrained optimum can be analyzed analogously. To connect to the previous analysis, rewrite (31) and (37) respectively as
1 0 Most of the most commonly used distribution functions are log-concave: Uniform, Normal, Exponential, Logistic, Extreme Value, Laplace (Double Exponential), Power Function, (c 1), Weibull (c 1), Gamma (c 1), Chi-Squared (c 2), Chi (c 1), Beta (a 1, e). Note also that Theorem 9 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) shows that, if a probability distribution has a log-concave (log-convex) density function (cumulative distribution function), then any truncation of this probability distribution will also have a log-concave (log-convex) density function (cumulative distribution function). Thus, N 0 (x) < 0 under all commonly used distributions. Given (41), the …rst best planner's solution for the cuto¤ is
This determines the willingness to pay of consumers for any variety. As c o > c, all entrants produce. How much they produce can be determined by noticing that expression (35) implies q o ( c) = (L= ) (c o c) so that we can rewrite (43) to obtain …rm output as
Then, by using (36) and (43), we …nd that the number of varieties supplied is
Turning to the market equilibrium, expression (42) implies that, with no heterogeneity, the cuto¤ evaluates to
Again, the willingness to pay c m is larger than the common marginal cost c, so all entrants produce. Furthermore, expression (30) implies q m ( c) = (L=2 ) (c m c), which can be used together with (46) to …nd …rm output
Furthermore, (32) and (46) imply that the number of …rms producing in the market economy is
It is readily veri…ed from (44) and (47) that we always have q o > q m . Moreover, from (45) and (48), we we also have N m > N o if and only if
which shows that each …rm is smaller in the market equilibrium than in the unconstrained optimum, and the market tends to overprovide variety when varieties are close substitutes ( small) and when the …xed cost f is low compared to market size as measured by and L. These results concur with those in Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) , taking into account that they assume L = 1. 
